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Stationary quasi-perfect equilibrium partitions
constitute the recursive core∗
La´szlo´ A´. Ko´czy†
Abstract
We present sufficient conditions for the implementation of the (pes-
simistic) recursive core (Ko´czy, 2007) in discrete partition function form
games using a modified version of the sequential coalition formation game
by Bloch (1996) extending the results of Ko´czy (2008) and –in a slightly
different setup– Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2006) to games with empty residual
cores (respectively, to games that are not r-balanced).
Subject classification: C71, C72
Keywords and phrases: discrete partition function, externalities, im-
plementation recursive core, sequential coalition formation, stationary
perfect equilibria, quasi-perfect equilibria
1 Introduction
Solving cooperative games with externalities remains a difficult problem in game
theory despite the numerous attempts that have been made. One school tries to
generalise solutions of TU games, the other seeks equilibria of noncooperative
coalition formation games. Our aim is to bridge the gap between the two schools
and implement the core also for games with externalities. The present paper
extends the results by Ko´czy (2008).
∗The author thanks the comments of an anonymous referee to (Ko´czy, 2008) that inspired
part of this paper and acknowledges the support of the European Union (MEIF-CT-2004-
011537).
†Budapest Tech, Faculty of Economics, Tavaszmezo˝ 15-17., H-1084 Budapest, Hungary
and Maastricht University, Department of Economics, P.O.Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht,
The Netherlands, koczy.laszlo@kgk.bmf.hu
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Studying the relation of noncooperative models and the core is not new
(Chatterjee et al., 1993; Lagunoff, 1994; Perry and Reny, 1994). Most of the
work has, however, focussed on TU-games and therefore ignore externalities.
Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2006) and Ko´czy (2008) study games with externalities,
but their results are limited to games with non-empty residual cores, or, in
terms of sequential coalition formation games: to games with stationary perfect
equilibria. It turns out that perfectness is a very demanding condition and the
implementation might fail even for games without externalities if we insist on
it. We therefore introduce a generalisation, stationary quasi-perfectness, such
that the resulting equilibria coincide with the recursive core.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After a basic setup and the in-
troduction of the notation we present the sequential coalition formation game
and define the concept stationary quasi perfect equilibrium. Then we define the
recursive core and finally we present our results.
2 Preliminaries
Let N denote the set of players. Subsets are called coalitions. A partition piS
of S is a splitting of S into disjoint coalitions. ΠS is the set of partitions of S.
The game (N, v) is given by the player set N and a discrete partition function
(DPF, Lucas and Macelli, 1978) v : Π(N) 7−→ RN , where vi(pi) denotes the
payoff for player i in case partition pi formed. For vectors x, y ∈ RN we write
x >S y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ S ⊂ N and there exists j ∈ S such that xj > yj .
A rule of order ρ is a strict ordering of the players. Let ρ(S) denote the
player ranked first in the set S and ρS the restriction of the ordering to S.
In the following we present the two approaches. A noncooperative bargaining
game that is a slight modification of the sequential coalition formation game
of Bloch (1996) and the recursive core (or its adaptation to discrete partition
function form games; Ko´czy, 2007, 2008), a cooperative solution concept, itself
a generalisation of the core.
2
2.1 Sequential coalition formation
First we present the noncooperative bargaining game. A game of sequential
coalition formation (SCF) (v, ρ) (Bloch, 1996) is defined by a DPF v and the
rule of order ρ. It is played as follows.
1. Start at the highest ranked player.
2. The current player proposes a coalition S it is a member of also specifying
the partition of the coalition.
3. If all members of S have approved the proposal, the coalition forms and
these players exit. Otherwise following player in S gets the word. He can
reject the proposal, become the next proposer and the game continues at
step 2. Alternatively, he can accept the proposal and the step is repeated.
4. If all players have left, the game terminates, otherwise return to Step 1.
In the original model the partition of S was trivial: consisting of the single
coalition S. For a detailed discussion of the benefits of this modification see
Ko´czy (2006).
Should the algorithm not terminate we must make special provisions to
determine payoffs. Let K be the set of players who have formed partition piK .
Then, for the strategy profile σ the payoffs are given by the following:
vi(pi(σ)) =
0 i ∈ N \Kminpi⊃piK vi(pi) i ∈ K (2.1)
Note that our definition is different from Bloch’s who considers optimistic
players, that is, vi(pi(σ)) = minpi⊃piK vi(pi) for i ∈ K. The implications of this
difference will be clear later, but let us provide a motivation for this change in
terms of deviations, a concept we formalise later. A deviation is profitable if it is
weakly profitable to all players. Suppose this deviation creates a subgame where
the sequential coalition formation game continues indefinitely. In absence of a
stable partition, any of the partitions might form. Optimistic players expect the
best: a partition beneficial to the deviation will form. Bloch’s players’ optimism
goes further: they individually hope the best, so that a deviation may take place
if it is profitable for some but creates losses for others. Pessimism is consistent
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in this sense: A player will not deviate if any of the possible partitions will
create a loss to him, in other words a deviation is profitable for K if and only
if it is profitable for each player in K and for each possible partition.
In the following we formalise the model using Bloch’s notation.
A history ht = (Kˆ(ht), piKˆ(ht), Tˆ (h
t), S, i) at date t is a list of offers, accep-
tances and rejections up to period t, where Kˆ(ht) ⊂ N is the set of players who
have already left the game, piKˆ(ht) ∈ Π(Kˆ(ht)) is the set of coalitions they have
formed, Tˆ (ht) is the ongoing proposal, S ⊂ N who have already accepted the
proposal, finally i ∈ N is the player active at time t. The collection of histories
at which i is active is denoted Hi.
Strategy σi of player i is a mapping from Hi to his set of actions:
σi(ht) ∈
{Yes,No} if τˆ(h
t) 6= ∅
T(i, Kˆ(ht)) if τˆ(ht) = ∅
(2.2)
where T(i, Kˆ(ht)) =
{
τ ∈ Π(T ), T ⊆ N \ Kˆ(ht), i ∈ T
}
, the set of partitions
that i can form with the remaining set of players.
We are interested in stationary strategies:
Definition 1. A strategy is stationary if it does not depend on history, but
only on the current state s = (piK , τ).
Definition 2. A stationary perfect equilibrium σ∗ is a strategy profile such that
for all players i ∈ N , for all states s and for all strategies σi of player i we have
vi(pi(σ∗(s))) ≥ vi(pi(σi(s), σ∗−i(s))). (2.3)
2.2 Recursive core
The second model is a cooperative solution concept, a generalisation of the core
to games in partition function form.
Our definition of the recursive core (Ko´czy, 2007) is adapted from the pes-
simistic version to DPF games just as it has been used in Ko´czy (2008). First
we introduce the notion of residual game:
Definition 3 (Residual Game). Let R be a subset of N and piS a partition of
its complement S. The residual game (R, vpiS ) is the DPF form game over the
player set R and with the DPF vpiS : Π(R)→ RR, where vpiS (piR) = v(piR∪piS).
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The residual game is a discrete partition function form game and in the
recursive core the same solution is used to solve this game as the original one.
Before defining the core, please note that as the partition uniquely determines
payoffs, instead of imputations or payoffs, the core consists of partitions.
Definition 4 (Recursive core). The definition consists of four steps.
1. Trivial game. C({1} , v) = {{1}} .
2. Inductive assumption. Given the definition of the core C(R, v) for every
game with |R| < k players we define dominance for a game of k players.
Let A(R, v) denote the assumption about the game (R, v). If C(R, v) 6= ∅
then A(R, v) = C(R, v), otherwise A(R, v) = Π(R), the set of partitions.
3. Dominance. The partition pi is dominated via the coalition S forming
partition piS if for all assumptions piR ∈ A(N \ S, vpis) we have v(piS ∪
piR) >S v(pi).
The partition pi is dominated if it is dominated via a coalition.
4. Core. The core of a game of k players is the set of undominated partitions
and we denote it by C(N, v).
For a discussion of its properties see Ko´czy (2007).
3 Order-independent equilibria and the core
We show that the set of partitions produced by certain order independent equi-
libria (OIE, Moldovanu and Winter, 1995, p.27) of the SCF game coincide with
the recursive core. While previously we have studied strategies that are sta-
tionary perfect by our previous result (Ko´czy, 2008) OIE under this provision
only exist for games with nonempty residual cores. This condition seems rather
limiting and we therefore augment the set of interesting strategy profiles with
stationary quasi-perfect ones.
3.1 Stationary quasi-perfectness
For our implementation we need to modify not only these definitions, but even,
slightly, the way the game is played. Bloch’s original coalition formation game
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specifies a characteristic function and a rule of order. Ko´czy (2008) has used
the concept of order independent equilibrium (Moldovanu and Winter, 1995),
where an equilibrium strategy profile must work for all possible orders of players
and result in the same payoff vector. This means that a strategy profile is an
equilibrium if, for whatever rule of order it neutralises deviations. Here we go a
step further and only consider deviations that are profitable for all possible rules
of orders. In essence the players choose strategies, possibly announce deviations
and then, when all is known, the order is given. For games with non-empty
residual cores, the two models yield the same equilibria.
The equivalence result (Ko´czy, 2008) predicts that games with empty resid-
ual cores do not have stationary perfect equilibria. On the other hand, just as
the recursive core may be non-empty even if the game has empty residual cores,
with an appropriately defined concept, we may retain some equilibrium-like
behaviour in the corresponding sequential coalition formation games, too.
Bloch (1996) presents an example of a game without stationary-prefect
strategies. It appears, a slight imperfection, such as the lack of stationary-
perfect strategies in the smallest of subgames spoils the existence of stationary
perfect equilibria in the main game, even if the subgames in question are simply
never played. If we can ignore such “bad” subgames, put them in quarantine
(in essence lying that they are good) can save the whole game from poison-
ing. The good news is that there are indeed irrelevant subgames, that we can
put into quarantine and worry only about the rest. In the following we first
clarify which subgames are relevant and then we define stationary quasi perfect
equilibria applying the perfectness condition only to relevant subgames.
Definition 5. For a strategy profile σ a subgame s = (piN\S , τ) is relevant if
• s is the original game (piN\S = τ = ∅),
• there exists a modification σ′, such that
– piN\S ⊆ pi(σ′),
– σ and σ′ differ in a single action outside subgame s, resulting in
piD = piN\S \ (pi(σ) ∩ pi(σ′)) leaving the game, and
– there exists a ρS such that v(pi(σ)) <D v(pi(σ′)), or
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• it is a relevant subgame of a relevant subgame.
We look at the second case first. As strategy profile σ is played, a deviation
occurs. We are of course interested in deviations that actually change the result-
ing partition, and if so, consider the players that first leave the game. The fact
that they all accepted the deviation indicates that they (weakly) benefit from
it. If they do not, irrespective of the strategies of the remaining players in the
game, there is no need to further specify the strategies for this hypothetical sub-
game, hence such a subgame is irrelevant. The same holds, for subgames that
make a deviation always profitable, but then we want to know what happens
after the deviation and hence the subgame is relevant. Finally we must deal
with subgames that are more than a single deviation away: here we consider
a sequence of subgames with 1-action differences and if these are respectively
relevant, the smallest subgame is one, too.
Definition 6. The strategy profile σ is a stationary quasi-perfect equilibrium
(SQPE) if
• σ is stationary
• restrictions to subgames that are relevant for σ are also SQPE profiles and
• for all states sK = (piK , τ) and for all strategy profiles σ′i(sK) with i 6∈ K
there exists an order ρN\K such that
vi(piK ∪ pi(σ′i(sK), σ−i(sK))) ≤ vi(piK ∪ pi(σ(sK))).
We denote the set of stationary quasi perfect equilibria by SQPE(N, v) and
partitions resulting from playing such equilibrium strategies by SQPP(N, v).
Quasi-perfectness is motivated by the difference between concave and quasi-
concave functions: There may be local deviations, but for the global picture
stationary perfectness must hold.
Observe that stationary perfect equilibria are also stationary quasi-perfect.
3.2 Results
Now that the concepts have been defined, we can present our main result.
Theorem 1. Let (N, v) be a DPF form game. Then C(N, v) = SQPP(N, v).
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The rest of this section is devoted to the inductive proof of this theorem. As
the proof is long, we break it into a number of propositions and finally present
a summary of these results.
The following proposition requires no proof:
Proposition 2. Let ({1} , v) be a trivial, single-player DPF form game. Then
C({1} , v) = SQPP({1} , v).
Now assume that Theorem 1 holds for all games with less than n play-
ers. In the following we extend it to games with n players. In order to show
SQPP(N, v) = C(N, v), first we show SQPP(N, v) ⊆ C(N, v) then SQPP(N, v) ⊇
C(N, v)
Lemma 3. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with up to k−1 players, SQPP(N, v) ⊆
C(N, v) for all k-player games.
Proof. If SQPP(N, v) = ∅ the result is trivial, so in the following we assume
that there exists a SQPE σ that results in the SQPP pi. In particular, we assume
that pi 6∈ C(N, v) and prove contradiction.
Our assumption is, by definition, equivalent to the existence of a profitable
deviation piD. The resulting subgame has fewer players so our inductive as-
sumption applies to it. We discuss three cases.
Case 1. The resulting subgame (piD,∅) is irrelevant. Then for all piN\D ∈
Π(N \ D) there exists i ∈ D such that vi(piD, piN\D) < vi(pi) – clearly the
deviation in the DPF game cannot be profitable; contradiction.
Case 2. The resulting subgame is relevant, the core of the corresponding
residual subgame is empty. Then v(piD, piN\D) >D v(pi) for all piN\D. Then
the following deviation is clearly profitable in the SCF game: when a player in
D has it turn, it rejects pending offers and proposes piD, clearly all in D will
accept. Hence pi is not a SQPP. Contradiction.
Case 3. The resulting subgame is relevant and the core of the corresponding
residual subgame is not empty. By assumption σ(piD,∅) is a SQPE such that the
deviation from σ to form piD is not profitable, and by the inductive assumption
pi(σ(piD,∅)) ∈ C(N \D, vpiD ). This, however implies that in the DPF game the
deviation piD is not profitable. Contradiction.
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We have discussed all cases, and found the assumptions contradicting. There-
fore pi ∈ C(N, v).
Lemma 4. If Theorem 1 holds for all games with less than k players, then
SQPP(N, v) ⊇ C(N, v) for all k-player games with nonempty residual cores.
Proof. The proof is inspired by that of Bloch (1996, Proposition 3.2) in part,
and is by construction. We show that if p˜i ∈ C(N, v) there exists a stationary
quasi-perfect strategy profile σ˜ = σ˜(K,piK , τ) such that pi(σ˜) = p˜i.
Let pi(τ) denote the partition that the acceptance of a proposal τ ultimately
produces. In the DPF form game piK , as a deviation defines a residual game
(N \K, vpiK ). We discuss two cases based on the emptiness of the core of this
residual game.
If the residual core is not empty a “harsh response” to piK is an element of
the residual core C(N \K, vpiK ) ensuring that the deviation piK is not profitable.
That is, p˜iN\K satisfies
∃i ∈ S : vi(piK , p˜iN\K) < vi(p˜i), or (3.1)
∀i ∈ S : vi(piK , p˜iN\K) = vi(p˜i). (3.2)
Since p˜i ∈ C(N, v) such a p˜iN\K exists for all deviations piK .
If the residual core is empty we observe that in order for a deviation to be
profitable it must be profitable for all residual partitions. Since p˜i ∈ C(N, v),
the deviation is not profitable and so there exists a residual partition p˜iN\K ∈
Π(N \K) satisfying Condition 3.1 or Condition 3.2.
The stationary strategy σ˜i for player i is then constructed as follows:
If piK = ∅, σ˜i(K,piK ,∅) = p˜i (3.3)
σ˜i(K,piK , τ) =
Yes if vi(pi(τ)) ≥ vi(p˜i)No otherwise.
If piK 6= ∅, σ˜i(K,piK ,∅) = p˜iN\K (3.4)
σ˜i(K,piK , τ) =
Yes if vi(pi(τ)) ≥ vi(piK , p˜iN\K)No otherwise.
In equilibrium pi(σ˜) = p˜i and the strategy is stationary by construction so we
only need to verify quasi subgame-perfection. We show this by induction. As
9
quasi subgame-perfection holds for a trivial game we may assume that it holds
for all games of size less than |N |.
Now consider game (N, v) and observe the following. If a set of players K
have left the game to form piK the subgame is simply a coalition formation game
with less players. We discuss two cases based on the emptiness of the residual
core.
1. If the residual core is not empty, the proposed strategy exhibits the same
similarity property: in equilibrium the core partition is proposed and accepted,
while residual cores form off-equilibrium.
The original assumption about smaller games then ensures that the off-
equilibrium path is quasi subgame perfect so we only need to check whether a
deviation τ is ever accepted. This deviation corresponds to a deviation in the
DPF game. Since p˜i ∈ C(N, v), by the construction of p˜iN\K we know that there
exists a player in S for whom the deviation τ is not profitable.
2. If the residual core is empty, the deviation is not profitable irrespective
of the residual partition that forms, the subgame is not relevant, and therefore
the second condition for quasi-subgame perfectness is satisfied.
The emptiness of the residual core, by our assumption, also implies that the
set of order-independent partitions is also empty, thus there are no stationary
quasi subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy profiles either. In the absence of
such strategy profiles the players in K cannot predict the partition of piN\K –
in this case, by Expression 2.1, they individually expect the worst. As piK only
forms if it is profitable, it will only if it is profitable for all partitions piN\K .
Since p˜i ∈ C(N, v) this is not the case. This, on the other hand implies that the
formation of p˜i is unaffected by possible deviations in this subgame, meeting the
third condition of stationary quasi-perfectness.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is by induction. The result holds for trivial,
single-player games. Assuming that the result holds for all k − 1 player games,
the result for k-player games is a corollary of Lemmata 3 & 4.
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4 Conclusion
Theorem 1 holds for arbitrary games in discrete partition function form, but
of course it is most interesting for games where some of the residual cores are
empty. When a proposal is made in a game without externalities the invited
players do not even (need to) consider the residual game and therefore the
emptiness of a residual core is not addressed. Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m (2006) and
Ko´czy (2008) simply restrict their attention to games where the residual cores
are non-empty, in fact the r-core (Huang and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2003) is not even defined
for games with empty residual cores. As already pointed out by Ko´czy (2007)
this is not only an enormous limitation given the number of conditions such
games must satisfy (one for each residual game), but the definitions/results do
not apply to some games without externalities and so they are not generali-
sations of the well-known results for TU-games. The present paper heals this
deficiency.
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